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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent 
vs. 
CALVIN GEORGE SMITH, JR., 
Appellant 
Case No. 19089 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Calvin George Smith, Jr., appeals from 
a conviction and judgment of Aggravated Robbery, a felony of 
the First Degree, and Theft, a felony of the Second Degree, in 
Lhe Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, Calvin George Smith, Jr., was charged 
Aggravated Robbery, a felony of the First Degree, in 
·iolation of Title 76, Chapter 2, Section 202, Title 76, Chapter 
o Section 203(1), and Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 302 Utah 
· 0 de Annotated (1953 as amended) and Theft, a felony of the 
3econd Degree, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 2, Section 
'0:', Title 76, Chapter 3, Section 203 (2), and Title 76, Chapter 
Section 404 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). He was 
convicted as charged in a jury trial and was sentenced to 
incarceration at the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate 
term as provided by law respectfully. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the conviction for Aggravatej 
Burglary and Theft and the judgment rendered below and/or to 
the case remanded to the Third Judicial District for a new tria: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 1, 1981, Alma G. Winn was the victim of an 
Aggravated Robbery and a Theft. Mr. Winn was accosted during 
the evening hours as he exited his vehicle and attempted to 
walk from his vehicle through his garage and into his home. 
Winn was robbed at gun point by two assailants (T.6-10). 
At trial, the prosectuion introduced the testimony of 
two witnesses who both implicated the appellant in the commiss· 
of this offense. One witness, Jay Sanchez, received complete 
immunity for both this first degree felony (T. 22) as well as 
thirty to forty other first degree felonies (T. 63). The otl-ier 
witness who implicated the appellant, Edwin Xitchell, was a 
co-defendant up until the evening immediately preceding the 
commencement of the trial (T.98). At that late date, '.lr. 
Mitchell struck a deal with the prosecution and agreed to 
testify against the appellant in return for being permitted ' 
plead to the lesser charge of robberv (T.09J. On stren·:" 
2 
these witnesses, both of whom had a motive to lie, the 
0 prellant was convicted by a jury. 
During closing arguments, defense counsel for the 
appellant pointed out for the jury that a reasonable doubt 
could arise from the absence or a lack of evidence. Specifi-
cally, defense counsel pointed to the fact that two witnesses 
had not been called to testify on behalf of the State. At 
that point, the Court interrupted counsel and instructed the 
iury to disregard defense counsel's statements and further 
instructed the jury that the defendant had just as much right 
as the State to call the two "missing" witnesses to the stand. 
";he appellant moved for a new trial on the basis tha·t the Court's 
comment infringed on the appellant's right not to incriminate 
himself and not to present evidence. The motion for a new 
trial was denied. (See closing argument transcript pp.35-36.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED 
BY THE STATE TO ESTABLISH GUILT BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO ANY OFFENSE. 
The jury found the appellant guilty of aggravated robbery, 
1 first degree felony and theft, a second degree felony. The 
evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support the 
irrr:." s verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The victim of the robbery was not able to identify his 
-3-
assailants. He testified that it was dark in the garage where 
the robbery took place (T.10-11) and that both men had black 
silk stocking caps over their heads (T.6). The only evidence 
linking the appellant to the robbery was testimony from two 
individuals who had also been arrested for the same robbery. 
One of the witnesses was granted immunity for the robbery in 
return for his testimony against the appellant (T.63). The 
second witness was given a "deal," allowed to plead guilty to 
the lesser charge of robbery, in exchange for his testimony 
(T.99). Both of these witnesses had strong motives to lie. The 
appellant took the stand in his own behalf and testified that 
on the night in question he and his co-defendants spent the 
night with his father and step-mother (T.192). He testified 
that Mr. Fernandez left at approximately 4:00 a.m. on January 
1st (T.199), but the appellant remained at his father's house 
until late that afternoon (T. 203). This testimony was corrobor· 
ated by Carol Smith, the appellant's step-mother (T.151-154). 
physical evidence was presented which tied the appellant to the 
robbery nor was there any evidence presented to corroborate t1e 
testimony of the state's witnesses. 
It is well settled that a reviewing court has the authoc 
to reveiw a conviction based upon sufficiency of the evidence 
The standard for review was clearly stated in State v. Wilson. 
565 P.2d 66,68 (1977): 
In order for the defendant to successfullv 
challenge and overturn a verdict on the · 
ground of insufficiency of the evidence, 
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it must appear that upon viewing the 
evidence, reasonable minds must necessarily 
entertain a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime. 
Two conflicting versions of where the appellant was on the 
night of the robbery were presented at trial. One version was 
presented by two individuals who both had strong motives to 
lie. The second version was presented by the appellant and by 
his step-mother. Both the appellant and his step-mother testified 
that they did not have a close relationship (T.161,192-93) and 
therefore, the step-mother was the only witness who really had 
no personal stake in the outcome and no reason to lie. On a 
1978 manslaughter case, State v. John, 586 P.2d 410, 419 (Utah 
1978), this court stated: 
[A]n accused is presumed to be innocent 
until his guilt is proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Consequently, if there 
is any reasonable view of the credible 
evidence which is reconcilable with the 
defendant's innocence, it would naturally 
flow that there would be reasonable doubt 
as to his guilt. 
Ample evidence was presented at trial to indicate that the 
appellant was at home with his family on the night that the 
robbery occurred. This evidence was refuted only by two individ-
:ials with strong motives to lie. There must be reasonable doubt 
as to which of the witnesses' stories was true and, therefore, 
"here must be reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the appellant. 
'.n light of this doubt, the verdict cannot stand. 
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POINT II 
IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE COURT TO 
COMMENT ON THE EVIDENCE DURING DEFENSE 
COUNSEL'S CLOSING ARGUMENT. 
During the closing argument by counsel for the appellant, 
the following exchange took place: 
MR. BUDGEN: Why does he--you know, why 
do these guys use Jay Sanchez? 
All he does is supply the gun. Isn't that 
interesting? Do you honestly believe that that 
is all that Jay Sanchez did in these cases? 
This case? Do you think all he aid was supply 
a gun, that that was it, that he was just along 
for his good companionship beyond that? 
Jay Sanchez planned these things. They gave 
immunity to the bad guy. The bad guy. That is 
who they gave immunity to. 
What else does he tell us about the gun? 
He always had it handy, he kept it at his cousin, 
Dickie Carrillo's house. Dickie Carrillo, who we 
know he did another robbery with. We know that. 
He can't deny that because Dickie is caught with 
him and he tells the authorities that at that time 
Dickie always keeps his gun. 
Well, I wonder if Dickie Carrillo wasn't at 
the Winn robbery. I wonder if Dickie Carrillo 
wasn't there with a gun, too, and where was Dickie 
Carrillo? Whose burden of proof is it? 
It's Mr. Sol tis' s burden of proof and evidence 
can arise not from what is actually presented, but 
a reasonable doubt can always exist with respect to 
what is never presented. 
Where is Dickie Carrillo? Where is Shawna 
Johnson? Where are these witnesses? The State 
never produced those witnesses. 
THE COURT: I am going to te 11 the jury you 
had as much right to bring them in as anybody and 
they were not necessary, and the State did not 
have any requirement to bring them into this case 
regarding as to other matters. And the jury wi 11 
disregard what Counsel said, where is Shawna , 
Johnson and Dickie Carrillo, because the State hac 
no burden as relates to them in this case and the 
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defendant had all of the rights of the State 
to bring them in. 
MR. BUDGEN: May I proceed, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Now, let's proceed and keep 
within our rules. 
(Closing argument T.35-36.) The court's comment on the evidence 
and refusal to allow defense counsel to comment on the absent 
.. ,itnesses was reversible error on a number of separate grounds. 
A. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION FORBID COMMENT 
ON THE ASSERTION OF THE RIGHT TO REMAIN 
SILENT AND NOT INCRIMINATE ONESELF. 
It has been well settled since the decision in Griffin v. 
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), that comment on a defendant's 
decision not to take the stand and hence to remain silent is 
reversible error. In Griffin, the U.S. Supreme Court was asked 
to rule on the constitutionality of a California rule allowing 
comment on the fact that a defendant had not testified. In 
finding the rule unconstitutional, the court stated: 
[C]omment on the refusal to testify is 
a remmant of the "inquisitorial system 
of criminal justice," Murph5 v. Water-
front Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52,5 ,12 L.Ed. 
2d 678, 681, 84 S.Ct. 1594, which the 
Fifth Amendment outlaws. It is a 
penalty imposed by courts for exer-
cising a constitutional privilege. 
It cuts down on the privilege by making 
its assertion costly .... We ... hold 
that the Fifth Amendment, in its direct 
application to the Federal Government, 
and in its bearing on the States by 
reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
forbids either comment by the prose-
cution on the accused's silence or 
instructions by the court that such 
silence is evidence of guilt. 
1t 614-15. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has also held prosecutorial 
on the evidence reversible error. In State v. Eaton, 569 p 
1114 (Utah 1977), the proseuctor, in his closing argument, SiJ' 
that "only [the] government witness and defendant 'really kno,1s 
what took place in that house' and 'What does the defendant tel 
S
? I II u . . Id. at 114. The prosecutor also remarked that they 
'"never heard one shread of evidence from the defendant' in suppo:. 
of defendant's contention. Id. This court held that 
those remarks constituted reversible error despite the fact tha: 
the prosecutor did not directly comment on the defendant's 
to testify. The court stated that the prosecutor's remarks weu 
Id. at 1116. 
. but a thinly disguised attempt to 
do indirectly what the prosecutor knew 
could not properly be done directly: 
that is, to comment on the fact that the 
defendant had chosen not to take the 
witness stand; and to persuade the jury 
to draw inferences as to his guilt 
because of his exercise of that consti-
tutional privilege. 
In a more recent case, State v. Urias, 609 P.2d 1326, 
(Utah 1980), this court said: "[W]hen a person invokes his 
constitutional right, the prosecution should not comment the:-e··· 
nor so use it in any way chat wi 11 tend to impair or des tro:· 
privilege." 
In the present case, as an offshoot of the defendJnt'" 
constitutional right to remain silent, a decision was made nc' 
to use particular witnesses. The court erred in commenting 
this decision and the comment clearlv tended to i:r.pair tC--.e 
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right not to produce the witnesses. 
B. EVEN IF IT IS FOUND THAT THE COURT'S 
COMMENT DID NOT VIOLATE THE APPELLANT'S 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT 
THE COMMENT DID IMPERMISSIBLY SHIFT ' 
THE BURDEN OF PRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE 
TO THE APPELLANT IN THE EYES OF THE 
JURY. 
It is a well established tenet that it is the burden of 
the prosecution to prove every element of the offense charged. 
This court clearly stated in State v. Mitcheson, 560 P.Zd 1120, 
1122 (Utah 1977), "The entry of a plea of not guilty places upon 
the State the burden of proving every element of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt." The defense has no burden of proof 
and no burden of production of evidence. "The ultimate burden of 
?roving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt remains 
on the state, whether defendant offers any evidence in an effort 
•_o prove affirmative defenses or not." State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 
694, 695 (Utah 1980). The comment of the court made it appear 
to the jury that the appellant had a duty to call witnesses. From 
appellant's failure to call these witnesses then the inference 
t:1at their testimony would have been harmful to the appellant 
·.1as clear. As the appellant had no burden to produce evidence, 
•he inference that he should have called the mentioned witnsses 
11ich must be drawn from the court's comment was clearly prejudi-
and reversible error. 
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POINT III 
IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE COURT TO 
REFUSE TO ALLOW DEFENSE COUNSEL TO COMMENT 
IN HIS CLOSING ARGUMENT ON THE ABSENT 
WITNESSES. 
A recent Utah Supreme Court case, State v. Potter, 627 
P.2d 74,78 (1981) stated: "The trial court has a duty to 
instruct the jury on the law applicable to the facts of the case 
Encompassed in this duty is the right of the defendant to have 
his theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear and 
understandable way." See also State v. Stone, 629 P. 2d 442 (Ur;· 
1981); State v. Brown, 607 P. 2d 261 (Utah 1980); State v. Eagle 
611 P. 2d 1211 (Utah 1980). By refusing to allow the appellant'' 
counsel to comment on the missing witnesses, the court effecti•:e: 
prevented the defense counsel from presenting the defense theor 
of the case to the jury. 
It was obvious from the testimony that the defense theoc 
of this case relied heavily on the appellant's ability and the 
likelihood that two other individuals, the missing witnesses, 
were the actual participants in the robbery. The court would 
not allow defense counsel to present this theory. 
The requirements to allow comment on missing witnesses 
were well articulated in United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d qo· 
(7th Cir. 1976). The requirements mentioned in that case i-c: 
(1) that the absent witness is particularly within the other 
party's power to produce; and (2) that the testimon; of the 
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would elucidate issues in the case and not be merely 
Both of these requirements were met in the present 
;case. 
The first requirement, according to the Mahone case, 
either when the· witness is physically available only to the 
opposing party or when "the witness has a relationship with the 
opposing party 'that would in a pragmatic sense make his testimony 
unavailable to the opposing party regardless of physical avail-
ability.'" Id. at 926. The situation in the case at bar 
falls within the second alternative. Since the prupose of having 
Carrillo and Johnson testify would have been to clear the 
appellant by incriminating themselves, it is not reasonable to 
believe that either missing witness would have testified for the 
defense. The second Mahone requirement is also met in this case. 
The testimony of the absent witnesses would not have been cumulative 
And would have elucidated some critical issues in this case. 
Because the facts meet the requirements established by 
United States v. Mahone, supra, the defense counsel should have 
'ieen allowed to comment on the absent witnesses during this 
closing argument. The failure to allow such comment prevented 
defense from effectively presenting its theory of the case 
hich is a right long recognized by Utah courts. The court's 
to allow comment on the missing witnesses was clearly 
· to the appellant and must therefore be considered 
··vcrsible error. 
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CONCLUSION 
The evidence presented at trial was not sufficient [,; 
sustain a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of 
aggravated robbery and theft. Not only was the evidence prese: 
contradictory and inconclusive but there was also ample evidenc, 
presented to give rise to a reasonable doubt under the standar: 
articulated in State v. John, supra. The conviction therefore, 
cannot stand and must be reversed. 
The comment made by the court during the.closing argumen: 
of defense counsel was reversible error as it violated the 
appellant's right against self-incrimination and it shifted the 
burden of production of evidence to the appellant in the eyes o: 
the jury. The court's refusal to allow defense counsel to colllI:lec 
upon the missing witnesses was error as it prevented the defense 
from adequately presenting its theory of the case. 
In State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah 1977), this 
court stated: 
Consistent with the nature of criminal 
proceedings and the protections accorded 
those accused of crime under our law, 
including the presumption of innocence 
and the burden of the state to prove the 
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, we believe that, on appeal, when 
there is a reasonable doubt as to whether 
the error below was prejudicial, that doubt 
should be resolved in favor of the defendant, 
This is especially true where the error 
is one which transgresses against the exercise 
of a constitutional right. Consequentlv, the 
rule which we have numerous times stated is 
that if the error is such as to justifv a 
belief that it had a substantial adverse 
-12-
effect upon the defendant's right to a 
fair trial, in that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that in its absence there may 
have been a different result, then the 
error should not be regarded as harmless, 
and conversely, if the error is such that 
is it clear beyond a resonable doubt that 
it was harmless in that the result would 
have been the same, then the error should 
not be deemed prejudicial and warrant 
granting a new trial. 
In the instant case, the error was prejudicial and the 
court's comment clearly had a substantial adverse effect upon 
the defendant's right to a fair trial. Because of this, the 
conviction cannot stand. 
DATED this June, 1984. 
Respectfully subn:itted, 
/ 
/ 
84111 
DELIVERED two copies of the foreging Brief of 
to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this _L1__ day of 
!1 
l ., ., \,\ 
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